




uring recent years, Japanese monetary policy has been the topic of a
great deal of discussion, commentary, and debate. This is not only
because of the great practical importance of the long-lasting slump
of the world’s second largest national economy, but also because the situation
in Japan has raised interesting issues concerning some fundamental topics in
monetary theory. Accordingly, this paper considers issues relating to recent
and prospective policy measures of the Bank of Japan (BOJ).
It is hard to avoid the impression that Bank of Japan (BOJ) policy has
been overly restrictive for approximately a decade. That statement does not
imply that Japan’s poor economic performance during the 1990s was entirely
or even primarily attributable to monetary policy, for structural ﬂaws have
also been very important.1 It does suggest, however, that Japanese economic
performance would have been less undesirable if BOJ policy had been less
restrictive. In the pages that follow, I will attempt to support the foregoing
claim, discuss the difﬁculty faced by the BOJ because of the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates, and illustrate this difﬁculty with a small quantitative
study. ThenIwilltakeupsomeofthenonstandardpolicyapproachesthathave
been proposed and will argue that the most promising of these would entail
rapid monetary base growth effected largely through purchases of foreign
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1 Major banking-system difﬁculties are widely recognized, and in addition it is likely that
the growth rate of “potential” or “natural-rate” output has fallen from the level of the 1970s and
1980s. But the severity of the bank-solvency problem has been increased by the deﬂation of
the past several years, and it is almost certainly the case that actual output has fallen far below
potential.
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exchange. Such a strategy has faced two major objections, however, so much
of the paper is devoted to counterarguments to these objections. The ﬁrst
objectionisbasedonlegalprovisionsoftheBankofJapanLawandthesecond
on the concern that such actions would constitute a “beggar-thy-neighbor”
policy that would reduce Japanese demand for imports. It is argued that
neither of these objections is appropriate. With respect to the former, it is
suggested that the BOJ Law, as written, includes conﬂicting provisions and
that foreign exchange purchases for the purpose of monetary control could be
conducted if the BOJ were to request permission of the government. In this
regard, the intimate connection between monetary and exchange-rate policies
is emphasized. With respect to the beggar-thy-neighbor issue, it is argued
that in fact an expansionary monetary policy of the type recommended would
increase net Japanese imports. In this regard, a major portion of the paper
is devoted to a quantitative analysis of the trade-balance effects of a policy
of the recommended type. The analysis is carried out in the context of a
dynamic optimizing model of an open economy, which is exposited in some
detail. Policy simulation exercises conducted with this model represent a
major feature of the paper.
1. HAS BANK OF JAPAN POLICY BEEN TIGHT?
That BOJ policy has been quite tight—low interest rates notwithstanding—
is suggested by the most prominent and widely-respected guideline for the
conduct of monetary policy, i.e., the policy rule developed by John Taylor
(1993a). The Taylor rule can be expressed as
Rt = 3 +  pa
t + 0.5( pa
t − 2) + 0.5(yt −¯ yt), (1)
where R is the call rate,  pa
t is the average inﬂation rate (GDP deﬂator) over
the previous four quarters, y is real GDP and ¯ y is its potential value.2 A chart
contrasting Taylor-rule prescriptions for the overnight call rate3 with actual
values of this rate over the years 1972–1998 appeared in a recent paper in
this journal (McCallum, 2000b) to which the reader is referred for various
details.4 That comparison is reproduced in the top half of Figure 1. There it
is clear that the actual value exceeded the setting prescribed by Taylor’s rule
during almost every quarter beginning with 1993Q1 and continuing through
1998Q4. Of course, the negative values called for by the rule are not feasible,
2 Here the long-run average real rate of interest is taken to be 3 percent per annum (p.a.)
and the inﬂation target rate to be 2 percent. Some versions of the rule use other values for these
and for the coefﬁcients attached to the target variables.
3 The (uncollateralized) overnight call rate was the BOJ’s operating target or instrument vari-
able through the period of the 1990s. The procedure was changed in March 2001.
4 The most important of these, of course, is the measurement of “potential” output—which
has been especially problematic for Japan in recent years. Its reliance on this inherently difﬁcult
concept is one weakness of the Taylor rule.B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 3
Figure 1 Policy Rule Indications
but that does not alter the fact that Taylor’s policy guideline has called for
greater monetary ease through this period.
An alternative rule involving management of the monetary base has been
promoted in several of my papers (e.g., McCallum 1988, 1993, 2000b). It can
be written as
 bt = 5 −  va
t + 0.5(5 −  xt−1), (2)4 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
where b and x are logs of the monetary base and nominal GDP, while  va
t is
the average rate of base velocity growth over the previous four years. Here
5 is the target value for nominal GDP growth, obtained from a 2 percent
inﬂation target and a 3 percent assumed long-run average growth rate for real
GDP.This rule is much less prominent thanTaylor’s, primarily because actual
central banks focus upon interest rates, not monetary base growth rates, in
designing their policy actions. Especially in an environment with near-zero
call rates, however, its prescriptions may be of interest. In any event, the
actual and rule (2) settings for base growth rates are shown in the lower panel
of Figure 1.5 There the indication is that actual BOJ policy has been too tight
virtually all of the time since the middle of 1990!6
Increased base money growth rates have been recommended for several
years by Mr. Nobuyuki Nakahara, a member of the BOJ’s Monetary Policy
Board (MPB).7 But until the change that was announced at the MPB meeting
on March 19, 2001, the BOJ’s position was that additional base growth would
havenostimulativeeffectsinceshort-termnominalinterestrateswerecloseto
zero. With such low rates, base money and short-term government securities
(bills) become almost perfect substitutes, so purchases of the latter by the
BOJ have no effect on asset markets and consequently none on the economy,
according to the BOJ view. That position will be discussed in the next two
sections.
2. THE BANK OF JAPAN’S DIFFICULTY
Over the period 1999–2001, commentary in inﬂuential nonacademic publica-
tions including the Economist, the Financial Times, and the Wall Street Jour-
nal became increasingly critical of the BOJ for not providing more monetary
stimulus to aggregate demand in Japan. The plots presented in the previous
section also suggest that more stimulus is needed and has been needed for
years, but nevertheless I believe that much of the press commentary has failed
to recognize the difﬁculty of the problem that has faced the BOJ. It is not
just stubbornness that has prevented the BOJ from providing such stimulus,
for the nature of monetary policy actions is sharply different when short-term
interest rates are effectively equal to zero. It is not true that there has been
“nothing more that the BOJ can do,” but what needs to be done is different
than in normal conditions and the policy actions are more difﬁcult to design.
5 The plot is reproduced from the same source as before, which provides details.
6 Some early indication that BOJ policy was too tight during 1990–92 appears in McCallum
(1993, 35–36). Also see McCallum and Hargraves (1995).
7 Mr. Nakahara’s term as an MPB member ended in April 2002. The MPB currently includes
Mr. Shin Nakahara, who is not related to Mr. Nobuyuki Nakahara.B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 5
For some years, the BOJ took the position that nothing more could be
done, beyond lowering its overnight call rate well below one percent and
ﬁnally almost to zero. These statements were of questionable validity, as we
shall see, and perhaps reﬂected a fundamentally misguided tendency to think
of levels of nominal interest rates as direct indicators of monetary conditions,
with low rates representing expansionary policy. In fact, nominal rates will
be low (for given real rates) when expected inﬂation is low; thus low rates are
in large part an indication that monetary policy has been tight in the past, not
that it is loose in the present. Recognizing this last point, several critics have
arguedthattheBOJshouldgaugeitsactionsintermsofmonetarybasegrowth
rates, rather than interest rates, and should provide stimulus by increasing the
growth rate of the monetary base. As can be seen in the bottom half of Figure
1,mybase-growth-orientedpolicyrulewouldhavecalledforabout11percent
(per annum) growth rates over the period 1996–1998, rather than the values
of about half that magnitude that were actually recorded.
Itiscrucialtorecognize,however,thatjustexpandingthebasegrowthrate
will not be effective, in the face of zero interest rates, unless nontraditional
assets are purchased. Normally, open market operations are conducted by
exchanging base money for short-term government bills. But when short-
term interest rates are near zero, such purchases will have virtually no effect.
One way to understand this point is to recall that both base money and bills
are nominally-denominated paper assets that are virtually free from default
risk. What then is the difference between them as assets; why do people and
ﬁrms hold money when bills normally provide the holder with a higher rate
of interest? The answer, from traditional monetary theory, is that money is a
generally accepted medium of exchange that provides transaction-facilitating
services to its holders—services not provided by bills.8 Rational economic
agents then adjust their holdings of these two assets so as to equalize their net
beneﬁtsatthemargin. Thesumofpecuniaryinterestearningsplustransaction-
facilitating services is equated at the margin, for the two assets, with interest
earnings usually being lower and services higher for base money assets.
But when short-term interest rates fall to zero, then there is no difference
in the interest component of the net yield for the two assets, so their marginal
service yields will also be equal. That condition is brought about by holders
choosing to keep on hand a quantity of money large enough that its service
yieldatthemarginisdrivendowntozero. Butthen,atthemargin,basemoney
andbillsbecomeperfectsubstitutes—thedistinguishingcharacteristicofbase
money is lost (at the margin, not overall)! Consequently, open-market opera-
tions that exchange bills for money in private portfolios have effects that are
likethoseofreplacingabilliondollars’worthof$5FederalReserveNoteswith
8 Or provided to a lesser extent by bills. For a review of traditional monetary analysis, see
McCallum and Goodfriend (1988).6 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
abilliondollars’worthof$10FederalReserveNotes. Toanapproximation,in
otherwords, thereisnoeffect. Accordingly, anexpansionarymonetarypolicy
needs to be implemented in some nontraditional manner, e.g., by purchase of
nontraditional assets. Such a purchase would alter the composition, in private
portfolios, of these other assets relative to the sum of money plus government
bills, thereby stimulating some response on the part of private asset holders.9
3. SOME QUANTITATIVE RESULTS
Is there any empirical evidence supportive of the theoretical view just de-
scribed? A very simple but straightforward way to approach that question is
to examine the relationship between base money growth and the growth rate
of nominal GDP. To that end, let us consider an updated and modiﬁed ver-
sion of the simplest macroeconomic model of aggregate demand utilized in
McCallum (1993). It is a single-equation dynamic relationship of nominal in-
come growth and its dependence on money base growth. Let xt and bt denote
logarithms of nominal GDP and the adjusted monetary base, respectively, so
that  xt and  bt are quarterly growth rates. The data series utilized extend
from 1970Q1 through 2001Q3 and are seasonally adjusted.10
Least-squares estimation over the period 1970Q3–2001Q3 yields the fol-
lowing relationship:
 xt =− 0.0002 + 0.261  xt−1 + 0.344  xt−2 + 0.248  bt−1 (3)
(.0019)( . 0873)( . 0840)( . 0887)
R2 = 0.483 SE = 0.0116 DW = 2.15.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors, so  bt−1 evidently has a
highlysigniﬁcanteffecton xt anditssubsequentvalues. Thusifthisrelation
were structural, it would indicate that a money base rule could be devised to
keep nominal GDP growth reasonably close to a desired target path. A similar
relationshipwasutilizedinthatmannerinMcCallum(1993),whereitprovided
resultsquitecomparabletothoseofsmallbutsomewhatmorecomplexmodels
intended to be structural.11
Theissuetobeexaminedhere, bycontrast, iswhethertherelationshipbe-
tweenbasegrowthandnominalincomehas“brokendown”inrecentyears—as
9 One reader has suggested that it would be stimulative for the central bank to simply print
base money and give it to private individuals. In fact such a process would create an imbalance
in private portfolios and thereby lead to some type of reaction. But such a scheme combines
both monetary and ﬁscal policy. It is equivalent to a ﬁscal transfer of government bills to private
agents plus an open-market purchase of bills.
10 These series were obtained from the web pages of the BOJ (monetary base) and the
Japanese government’s Economic and Social Research Institute (GDP).
11 For a discussion of the potential vulnerability of the relationship to the Lucas critique, see
McCallum (1993, 37–38).B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 7
would arguably be the case with near-zero interest rates and traditional open-
marketpurchasesofgovernmentbills. Infact,suchanimpressionissupported
by visual inspection of a simple plot of those two variables against time. To
consider the matter more formally, however, I have reestimated relationship
(3) permitting crucial parameters to change in 1995Q1.12 Inclusion of a 0-1
dummy variable, that changes from 0 to 1 in 1995Q1, indicates a downward
shift in the equation’s constant term, with a highly signiﬁcant t-statistic of
–3.05. If instead the slope coefﬁcient on the base growth variable is permit-
ted to change at that time, again a signiﬁcant decrease is detected, with the
t-statisticbeing–3.31. Inclusionofbotheffectsseemsmostappropriate(since
the two variables are highly collinear) and leads to the following estimates:
 xt = 0.0031 + 0.137 xt−1 + 0.210 xt−2 + 0.399 (4)
(.0022)( . 091)( . 090)( . 103)
 bt−1 − 0.318 D95 ·  bt−1 − 0.0045 D95
(.192)( . 0041)
R2 = 0.531 SE = 0.0111 DW = 2.10.
Here we see that the estimate of the net effect of  bt−1 on  xt for the post-
1995observationsis0.399−0.318 = 0.081,averysmallvalue. Furthermore,
a Wald test of the hypothesis that the net effect equals zero gives a P-value
of 0.617, indicating that a zero-effect hypothesis could not be rejected at any
conventional signiﬁcance level.13 For all practical purposes, then, the recent
effectonnominalGDPgrowthofadditionalmoneybasegrowthhasbeenzero,
according to these last estimates. This ﬁnding is consistent with the notion
that, in a situation with near-zero short-term interest rates, BOJ purchase of
treasury bills will be ineffective as means of stimulating aggregate demand.
Of course, the simple investigation just conducted falls well short of what
would be required for a convincing counterfactual policy exercise, which
would require a well-speciﬁed structural model. But the results here are not
being used in that manner, i.e., to assess the effects of an alternative policy
rule. Instead they are being used only to indicate that a substantial breakdown
in the money-GDP relationship has occurred. For that purpose, the foregoing
exercise should be adequate.
12 This break date, or one close to it, is suggested by the extensive recent empirical study
by Miao (2000).
13 Together the two shift terms are highly signiﬁcant; a Wald test of the hypothesis that both
coefﬁcients equal zero results in a P-value of 0.0022.8 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
4. POLICY PROPOSALS
Let us now turn to the crucial issue, namely, how monetary policy can be con-
ductedinasituationwithinterestratesnearzero. Severalprominentmonetary




Goodfriend (2000) and Buiter and Panigirtzoglu propose a tax on base money
that would keep it from being a perfect substitute for short-term securities and
therebyopenthewayforaneffectivemonetarypolicyevenwhenazero-lower-
bound situation is in effect. This scheme’s logic is evidently impeccable, but
the probable unpopularity of the explicit tax on money would seem to present
a formidable practical barrier (even though it would make possible a reduced
average level of the implicit tax on money). Accordingly we will focus on the
other proposals, which involve the central bank purchase with base money of
assets other than the traditional short-term yen securities. Meltzer (2000), for
example, suggests that the purchase of long-term Japanese government bonds
would be stimulative. McCallum and Svensson suggest instead the purchase
of foreign exchange (i.e., short-term securities that are claims to dollars or
other non-yen currencies). The general ideas behind these asset-purchase
proposals are basically similar, but there are important practical differences.
As explained above, the basic idea is that for increased growth of base
money to be stimulative, it is necessary that the assets bought from private
portfolios be ones that are not perfect substitutes for government bills (or
for money). Otherwise, the composition of private portfolios will not be
affected in an economically relevant manner so no response will be induced.
Obviously, longer term government bonds represent one leading possibility.
But according to the expectations theory of the term structure, which says
that long-term interest rates are appropriate averages of expected short-term
rates, long-term and short-term government securities are perfect substitutes.
Now, there is evidence strongly suggesting that this theory is not empirically
accurate, but there is no widely accepted alternative to rely upon. What is
needed is a theory of the term premium that relates variations in that premium
to asset positions. In the absence of any widely accepted theory of that type,
it is not obvious how to design an appropriate policy or even that purchases of
long-term bonds would have an effect on aggregate demand in the appropriate
direction.14
Consequently, I have suggested that the best course of action would be
for the BOJ—or any central bank in a similar situation—to purchase foreign
exchange(McCallum,2000a,2002). LarsSvensson(2001)hasmadeaclosely
14A different and more optimistic position has recently been expressed by Goodfriend (2001).B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 9
related proposal.15 The difference is that in this case there is a more well
understood transmission channel, working via the exchange rate. It is clear
that the purchase of foreign exchange tends to depreciate the value of the
yen. With prices in Japan initially rising less rapidly than the price of foreign
exchange,16 a real exchange rate depreciation would result, and this would
tend to stimulate exports and to increase Japanese income and production.
That is of course what is desired—to increase Japanese income and spending.
It is important to keep in mind, in this regard, that increases in income
have strong and reliable positive effects on imports. Indeed, the strength of
income effects on imports is probably strong enough that the overall effect
of the stimulative policy would be to increase Japan’s imports (in real terms)
from its trading partners. Under that assumption it is not the case that the
recommendedpolicywouldtendtodepressaggregatedemandinothernations.
Fearofthatoutcomeisthereforenotasensiblereasonforavoidingstimulative
monetary policy.17 Indeed, it is not even clear that such a policy would induce
therealexchangeratetoappreciateformorethanashortperiodoftime. These
issues will be quantitatively explored below, in Sections 5 and 6.
Afewcriticsoftheforeign-exchangestrategyhavecontendedthatacentral
bank cannot reliably inﬂuence its currency’s exchange rate. In that regard it
is widely believed by analysts that raising a currency’s real foreign-exchange
value by monetary policy is not possible, and that keeping its nominal value
high would require extreme measures that would not be tolerated for long in
a nation with democratic political processes. But to depreciate a ﬁat currency
in nominal terms is not difﬁcult; the basic requirement is simply the creation
of an excess quantity of the currency.18 And a reduction in value is what is
needed in the case of Japan.19
Proceeding under the presumption that a central bank can exert adequate
control over its currency’s nominal exchange rate, McCallum (2000a, 2002)
has considered a policy rule for use in a zero-lower-bound situation of the
following form, with st representing the log of the home-country price of
15 It should be noted that a few economists, including myself, Marvin Goodfriend (1997),
Allan Meltzer (1998, 1999, 2000), and John Taylor (1997), have been urging a more expansionary
policy for the BOJ at least since 1995. Our ﬁrst proposals did not, however, emphasize purchases
of foreign exchange per se.
16 Even in the event that Japanese domestic prices increased along with the price of foreign
exchange, there would be a beneﬁt—this would raise nominal interest rates, leading to an escape
from the “liquidity trap” situation described above.
17 It is my impression that fear of this outcome did, in fact, keep U.S. and international
agencies from supporting policy proposals of the type expressed here, until recently. See Section
5 below.
18 For a more detailed argument, see McCallum (2000a, 2002).
19 Even a depreciation could not be effected if the currency were literally a perfect substitute
for foreign currencies, but such is not the case. Interesting new evidence of a market-microstructure
type has recently been developed by Evans and Lyons (2000, 2002).10 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
foreign exchange:
 st = µ0 + µ1(2 −  pt) + µ2(¯ yt − yt), µ1,µ 2 > 0. (5)
Here the rate of depreciation of the exchange rate  st is increased when
inﬂation and/or output are below their target values. Such a rule would be
implemented in a manner similar to that typically used with an interest-rate
instrument. Speciﬁcally, the central bank would observe the relevant asset
price almost continuously and make open-market purchases (sales) when a
depreciation (appreciation) is indicated.20 It is important to note that rule (5)
doesnotrepresentaﬁxedexchangerate. Tothecontrary,itrepresentsaregime




exchange as a way of providing a more stimulative monetary policy.21 We
need to look into the reasons for this neglect, of which two are prominent.
One of these involves the BOJ’s legal charter and the other stems from beliefs
concerning the effects on other nations’ balance of payments magnitudes.
Since the latter topic is the more analytical in nature, it will be considered
ﬁrst.
5. THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ISSUE
In this section we take up a major analytical issue concerning the policy po-
sition presented above. During the late 1990s, some leading ofﬁcials of the
International Monetary Fund were opposed to monetary stimulus as a means
for combating Japan’s ongoing economic weakness.22 Their reason was a be-
lief that monetary stimulus would lead to exchange rate depreciation, which
would be harmful to other nations seeking to expand (or, during the Asian
crisis, maintain) exports to Japan. This source of objection to a more stimu-
lative monetary policy is, however, inappropriate. First, it is highly unlikely
that such a policy would lead to lessened imports by Japan, for an increase
20As with current practice, market participants may to some extent move rates as desired
by the central bank, even without actual open-market operations, if the central bank’s intentions
are made clear.
21 In an interview with Bloomberg reported on July 19, 2001, Dr. Kunio Okina, Director of
the BOJ’s Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, suggested that the BOJ should consider
purchase of foreign exchange as a tool of monetary policy, while leaving exchange rates to the
currency market. But on July 25, Mr. Sakuya Fujiwara, Deputy Governor of the BOJ, indicated (in
a question-and-answer session at the Tokyo Foreign Correspondents’ Club) that Okina’s suggestion
does not reﬂect BOJ policy.
22 This claim is based in part on personal conversations. For some evidence, see Fischer
(1998), which proposes ﬁscal expansion and banking reforms but does not mention monetary pol-
icy. In his very recent comment in the Brookings Papers, Fischer accepts the need for Japanese
monetary stimulus, but still labels this a “beggar-thy-neighbor” policy (2001, 165).B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 11
in Japanese real income would tend to increase imports and most likely to
an extent greater than any decrease brought about by Japanese exchange rate
depreciation. Second, according to recent views of most academics and poli-
cymakers alike, monetary policy should be directed primarily toward keeping
inﬂation low (but non-negative!), with the avoidance of real cyclical ﬂuc-
tuations a possible secondary objective.23 From this perspective, ﬁscal and
structural policies are more appropriate tools to use in managing balance-of-
payments problems. Thus, if Japan is not going to share a common currency
with, e.g., the United States, then their bilateral exchange rate should be free
to ﬂoat with each country managing its monetary affairs so as to keep a low
inﬂation rate.24 From this perspective, one could argue that the United States
shouldnottrytouseitspoliticalinﬂuencetopreventadepreciationoftheyen.
Moregenerally,itwouldseemundesirableforanycountrytoattempttoinduce
other nations to manage their monetary policy in ways that are domestically
harmful but temporarily helpful for the country in question.25 From a long-
term perspective, the United States will beneﬁt from having other important
nations conduct their monetary policies in a manner that yields low inﬂation
with domestic macroeconomic stability.
Not all analysts would agree, however, with the contention that monetary
stimulus of the type here suggested would not have a depressing effect on
other nations’exports to Japan. Accordingly, this section and the next will be
devoted to a substantial consideration of that position. For such an issue it is
necessary to conduct analysis in a quantitatively speciﬁed structural model,
and the convincingness of the exercise will depend upon the qualiﬁcations of
the model utilized. The one that will be used was developed by McCallum
andNelson(1999)andutilizedsubsequentlybythem(2000)inanexploration
of relationships between CPI inﬂation and exchange-rate depreciation. The
model is not econometrically estimated using Japanese time series data, but
is a “new open-economy macroeconomic model”—i.e., is based on dynamic
optimizing analysis assuming sticky-price adjustments and solved assuming
rationalexpectations—thathasbeencalibratedtomatchcertaincharacteristics
of the Japanese economy. It differs from other contributions in the area,
however, in the manner in which imported goods are treated. In particular, the
M-N model treats imports not as ﬁnished goods, as is common, but instead
as raw-material inputs to the home economy’s producers. This alternative
23 Real cyclical conditions should provide only a secondary objective for monetary policy be-
cause monetary effects on these conditions are temporary and poorly understood, whereas monetary
effects on prices (and thus on inﬂation rates) are long-lasting and well understood.
24 Moreover, decisions to share a common currency should be made on grounds of micro-
economic efﬁciency, not in an attempt to solve macroeconomic stabilization difﬁculties.
25 Indeed, it may well have been U.S. pressure that led the BOJ to be somewhat too loose
(even on traditional standards that ignore asset price movements—see Figure 1, lower panel) during
1986–88, a stance that permitted Japan’s asset price boom of the late 1980s and set the stage for
a clampdown that began the past decade’s slump.12 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
modellingstrategyleadstoacleanerandsimplertheoreticalstructure, relative
to the standard treatment, and is empirically attractive. Since the optimizing,
general equilibrium analysis has previously been presented in McCallum and
Nelson (1999), here I will take an informal expository approach designed to
facilitate understanding of the model’s basic structure.
Itiswellknownthatoptimizinganalysisleads,inawidevarietyofinﬁnite-
horizon models that involve imperfect competition, to a consumption Euler
equation that can be expressed or approximated in the form
ct = Etct+1 + b0 + b1rt + vt, (6)
where ctis the log of a Dixit-Stiglitz consumption-bundle aggregate of the
many distinct goods that a typical household consumes in period t.26 In
(6), rt is the real interest rate on home-country one period bonds (private
or government) and vt is a stochastic shock term that pertains to household
preferences regarding present versus future consumption. In closed-economy
analysis, relation (6) is often combined with a log-linearized, per-household,
overall resource constraint to yield an “expectational ISfunction,” to use the
term of Kerr and King (1996). That step presumes that investment and capital
are treated as exogenous. The simplest version of that assumption is that the
capital stock is ﬁxed; since that assumption is rather common in the literature,
it is adopted here.
For an open-economy extension, one might be tempted to write the re-
source constraint as
yt = ω1ct + ω2gt + ω3xt − ω4imt, (7)
where yt, gt, xt, and imt are logarithms of real output, government consump-
tion, exports, and imports while ω1, ω2, ω3, and ω4 are steady state shares
of output for consumption, government purchases, exports, and imports. But
if imports are exclusively material inputs to the production of home-country
goods, and Yt = ln −1yt is interpreted as units of output, then the relevant
resource constraint is
yt = ω1ct + ω2gt + ω3xt. (7 )
It is desirable that import demand be modelled in an optimizing fashion.
Toward that end, assume that output of all consumer goods is effected by
producers that are constrained by production functions all of the same CES
form, with labor and material imports being the two variable inputs. Then the
cost-minimizing demand for imports is
imt = yt − σqt + const., (8)
26 Thus ct = ln Ct, with Ct = [
 
Ct(z)(θ−1)/θ dz]θ/(θ−1), where θ>1, z indexes
distinct goods, and the integral is over (0,1), while the corresponding price index is Pt =
[
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where σ is the elasticity of substitution between materials and labor in pro-
duction, and where “const.” denotes some constant.27 Also, qt is the log
price of imports in terms of produced consumption goods. We will refer to
Qt = ln−1 qt as the real exchange rate. Let Pt and St be the home-country
money price of goods and foreign exchange, with P ∗
t the foreign money price
of home-country imports. Then if pt, st, and p∗
t are logs of these variables,
we have
qt = st − pt + p∗
t . (9)
Symmetrically, we assume that export demand is given as
xt = y∗
t + σ∗qt + const., (10)
where y∗
t denotes production abroad and σ∗ is the price elasticity of demand
from abroad for home-country goods.
Nowconsideroutputdeterminationinaﬂexible-priceversionofthemodel.
Taking a log-linear approximation to the home-country production function,
we have
yt = (1 − α)at + (1 − α)nt + αi m t + const.,
where nt and at are logs of labor input and a labor augmenting technology
shock term, respectively. Suppose for simplicity that labor supply is inelas-
tic, with 1.0 units supplied per period by each household. Thus with full
price ﬂexibility we would have nt = 0 and the ﬂexible-price, natural rate (or
“potential”) value of yt will be ¯ yt = (1 − α)at + αi m t + const. so that
¯ yt = (1 − α)at + α[¯ yt − σqt] + const.,o r
¯ yt = at − [σα/(1 − α)]qt + const. (11)
But while ¯ yt would be the economy’s output in period t if prices could adjust
promptly in response to any shock, we assume that prices adjust only slug-
gishly. And if the economy’s demand quantity as determined by the rest of
the system (yt) differs from ¯ yt then the former quantity prevails—and work-
ers depart from their (inelastic) supply schedules so as to provide whatever
quantity is needed to produce the demanded output, with imt given by (8).
In such a setting, the precise way in which prices adjust has a direct
impact on demand and consequently on production. There are various models
of gradual price adjustment utilized in the recent literature that are intended
to represent optimizing behavior. In the analysis that follows, I will use
 pt = 0.5(Et pt+1 +  pt−1) + φ2(yt −¯ yt) + ut, (12)
where ut is a behavioral disturbance. This form of equation has been fairly
prominent, primarily because it tends to impart a more realistic degree of
27 That is, the expression “const.” in different equations appearing through the remainder of
the article will typically refer to different constant magnitudes.14 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
inﬂation persistence than does the Calvo-Rotemberg model (which is theoret-
ically more attractive).28
A standard feature of most current open-economy models is a relation
implying uncovered interest parity (UIP). Despite its prominent empirical
weaknesses, accordingly, the basic M-N model includes one:
Rt − R∗
t = Et st+1 + ξt. (13)
We include a time-varying “risk premium” term ξt, however, that may have a
sizeable variance and may be autocorrelated.
It remains to describe how monetary policy is conducted. In most recent
research in monetary economics, it is presumed that the monetary authority
conducts policy by adjusting a one-period nominal interest rate in response
to prevailing (or forecasted future) values of inﬂation and the output gap,
˜ yt = yt −¯ yt:
Rt = (1 − µ3)[µ0 +  pt + µ1( pt − π∗) + µ2 ˜ yt] + µ3Rt−1 + et. (14)
Hereµ3 > 0reﬂectsinterestratesmoothing. Quantitativeresultsreported
byM-N(1999,2000)arebasedonestimatedorcalibratedversionsofthisrule,
in most cases with Et−1 applied to ˜ yt and  pt.
To complete the model, we need only to include the Fisher identity,
(1 + rt) = (1 + Rt)/(1 + Et pt+1), which we approximate in the famil-
iar fashion:
rt = Rt − Et pt+1. (15)
Thus we have a simple log-linear system in which the ten structural relations
(6)–(15) determine values for the endogenous variables yt, ¯ yt,  pt, rt, Rt, qt,




t are taken to be exogenous—as are the shock processes for vt, at, et, and
ξt.
Of course, it would be possible to append a money demand function such
as
mt − pt = γ 0 + γ 1yt + γ 2Rt + ηt, (16)
and one of this general form—perhaps with ct replacing yt—would be con-
sistent with optimizing behavior.29 But, as many writers have noted, that
equation would serve only to determine the values of mt that are needed to
implement the Rt policy rule.
With the structure given above, a useful measure of the balance on goods
and services account—i.e., net exports—is
nett = xt − (imt + qt), (17)
28 See Fuhrer and Moore (1995) and Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999).
29 See McCallum and Nelson (1999) or many other papers.B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 15
whereitisassumedthatω3 = ω4. Thismeasureisusedinwhatfollows. Also,
incidentally, it is possible to calculate the log of the GDP deﬂator as
pDEF
t = [pt − ω3(st + p∗
t )]/(1 − ω3). (18)
Before moving on, it should be noted that an advantage of our strategy
of modelling imports as material inputs to the production process is that the
relevant price index for produced goods is the same as the consumer price in-
dex, whichimpliesthatthesamegradualpriceadjustmentbehaviorisrelevant
for all domestic consumption. In addition, it avoids the unattractive assump-
tion,impliedbythetradeableversusnontradeablegoodsdichotomization,that
export and import goods are perfectly substitutable in production.
Theoretical advantages would not constitute a satisfactory justiﬁcation,
of course, if in fact most imports were consumption goods. Such is not the
case, however, at least for the United States. Instead, an examination of the
data suggests that (under conservative assumptions) intermediate productive
inputs actually comprise a larger fraction of U.S. imports than do consumer
goods (including services).30
There is one way in which the model developed in McCallum and Nelson
(1999) differs signiﬁcantly from the 10-equation formulation just presented.
Speciﬁcally, the M-N model includes a somewhat more complex form of
consumption versus saving behavior, one that features habit formation. Thus
in place of the time-separable utility function that leads to equation (6), we
assume that each period-t utility term includes ct/(ct−1)h, with 0 ≤ h<1,
ratherthanct alone. Thatspeciﬁcationgivesrisetothefollowingreplacement
for (6):
ct = h0 + h1ct−1 + h2Etct+1 + h3Etct+2 + h4(logλt) + vt. (6 )
Here λt is the Lagrange multiplier on the household’s budget constraint,
which obeys
logλt = const. + Etλt+1 + rt, (19)
and there are constraints relating the hj parameters to others in the system.
For details and additional discussion, see M-N (1999) and the recent study of
Fuhrer (2000).
Calibration of the model draws on M-N (1999) but differs in a few ways
that, in retrospect, seem appropriate. For the parameters governing spending
30 For the year 1998, imported consumer goods amounted to $453 billion while imports of
business inputs came to $624 billion, approximately. These ﬁgures are based on an examination
of categories reported in the August 1999 issue of the Survey of Current Business. For several
categories it is clear whether they are composed predominantly of consumer or business goods.
For others, judgmental assignments were required. Those assignments are as follows, with the re-
ported ﬁgure being the fraction of the category classiﬁed as “business inputs”: automotive vehicles,
engines, and parts, 25 percent; travel, 25 percent; passenger fares, 25 percent; foods, feed, and
beverages, 50 percent; and other private services, 75 percent.16 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
behavior, I retain here the h = 0.8 value taken from an early version of Fuhrer
(2000), but for the counterpart of b1 I now use −0.4, rather than −1/6, in
order to reﬂect the greater responsiveness of investment spending, which is
not included explicitly in the model.31 For σ, the elasticity of substitution in
production (and therefore the elasticity of import demand with respect to Qt),
I again begin with 1/3—and for the elasticity of export demand with respect
to Qt the same value is used—but also consider larger values. In (11), the
labor-share parameter 1 − α equals 0.64. The steady state ratio of imports
(andexports)todomesticproductionistakentobe0.10, aslightlylowervalue
than in M-N (1999) so as to reﬂect the Japanese degree of openness. For the
present application government consumption is included, with ω2 = 0.2.
In the price adjustment relation, the speciﬁcation is that φ2 = 0.03. The
latter value is based on my reading of a wide variety of studies, plus con-
version into nonannualized fractional terms for a quarterly model. Policy
rule parameters should be thought of in relation to realistic values close to
µ1 = 0.5,µ 2 = 0.4, and µ3 = 0.8, the latter reﬂecting considerable interest
rate smoothing. In the experiments reported in this paper, however, rule (14)
is replaced by the rule (5) that is designed for the zero-lower-bound situation.
In most cases, expectations based on t − 1 data are used for the  pt and ˜ yt
variables appearing in the policy rule, in order to make the latter operational.
The stochastic processes driving the model’s shocks must also be cali-
brated, of course. For both foreign output and the technology shock, I have
speciﬁed AR(1) processes with AR parameters of 0.95, rather than the 1.0
values used in M-N (1999). The innovation standard deviations (SD) are 0.03
and(asbefore)0.0035. Thelattervaluemightappearsmallerthanisusual,but
is appropriate to generate a realistic degree of variability in ¯ yt when the latter
is not exogenous but instead is dependent on qt. The UIP risk premium term
ξt is generated by an AR(1) process with AR parameter 0.5 and innovation
0.04; these values are based on work reported inTaylor (1993b). Government
consumption (in logs) follows anAR(1) process, withAR parameter 0.99 and
innovation SD of 0.02. Finally, the vt, ut, and et shock processes are taken to
be white noise with SD values of 0.011, 0.002, and 0.0017, respectively.
6. SIMULATION RESULTS
In McCallum (2000a, 2002) I have conducted exercises with this model under
theassumptionthatthenominalinterestrateisimmobilizedatzero,inorderto
showthatmonetarypolicyconductedbymeansofarulesuchas(5)wouldpro-
vide stabilizing inﬂuence despite the “liquidity trap” situation. Those policy
experiments were not designed, however, to reﬂect the transitional effects of
31 The parameter in question is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption
when h = 0.B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 17
Figure 2 Responses to Policy Change, Initial Case
the adoption of such a rule; they were conducted as if the rule had been in
effect for a long period of time. In what follows, I will use a different strategy.
It will again be assumed that an exchange-rate rule has been in effect, but
the initial equilibrium is one that leaves the zero-interest situation intact. The
objective is to break out of that situation, so the “shock” to which the system
is subjected is an increase in the target rate of inﬂation. This is represented as
a permanent upward shock to π∗, the inﬂation target in the policy rule. Arbi-
trarily,theexperimentassumesa2.0percentper-annumshock,e.g.,from–1.0
percent inﬂation to +1.0 percent. In quarterly fractional units, that amounts
to an increase of 0.005 in π∗.32 The precise rule utilized is as follows, with
µ1 = 0.5 and µ2 = 0:
 st = Et−1 pt + µ1(π∗ − Et−1 pt) + µ2(¯ yt − yt). (20)
32 It should be said that I am not entirely comfortable with analysis of this type of “shock,”
which seems more like a regime change than the type of shock that RE policy analysis is best
designed to handle. Consequently, I would not take details of the dynamics too seriously, but
would limit attention to the general nature of the responses. (Many economists do, of course,
use rational expectations to analyze the effects of policy regime changes—i.e., to study transition
periods—but I have generally been skeptical of such studies.)18 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 3 Responses to Policy Change, Preferred Case
The variable on whose response we shall focus is the home country’s—
i.e., Japan’s—net export balance in real terms. Since the model is formulated
to be linear in logarithms of most variables, the measure actually calculated
is the log of real exports minus the log of real imports. These have to be
expressed in common price units, so induced changes in the real exchange
rate have to be taken into account. The negative of that measure is taken to
reﬂect the increase in net real exports by Japan’s trading partners.
Results of the ﬁrst experiment are shown in Figure 2. Responses over
40 quarter-years are shown for six variables: the log of real output (y), the
inﬂation rate ( p), the nominal interest rate (R), the log of the real exchange
rate (q), the rate of depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (ds), and the
net export variable in (17) (net). In Figure 2 we see that the upward jump
in the target inﬂation rate (π), which occurs in period 1, does indeed induce
an exchange-rate depreciation rate that remains positive for over two years.
Inﬂation, not surprisingly, rises and stays above its initial value for over two
years, then oscillates and settles down at a new steady state rate of 0.005 (in
relation to its starting value). Quite surprisingly, p responds more stronglyB. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 19
Figure 4 Responses to Policy Change,Alternative Case
than s so the real exchange rate appreciates.33 As expected, however, real
output rises strongly for two years. Most importantly, the real (Japanese)
export balance is so affected by the two-year increase in real output that it
turns negative and stays negative for almost two years, although it levels off
at a positive value. This pattern is only partly supportive of the argument
advanced above, but a single plausible change in the calibration alters it so as
to be almost entirely supportive.
The relevant point is that the parameter values used in Figure 2 include
ﬁgures of 1/3 for the import price elasticities (σ) both at home and abroad.34
That ﬁgure, originally selected by McCallum and Nelson (1999) for reasons
that do not pertain in the present exercise, are quite small. Most specialists
contend that such magnitudes are substantially larger, at least large enough to
satisfy the venerable Marshall-Lerner condition (i.e., that their sum equals 1.0
or more). Accordingly, in Figure 3 the same experiment is repeated but with
33 It has been veriﬁed that steady state response value is zero, reﬂecting long-run monetary
neutrality. But it takes many years for q to return to its original vicinity.
34 In what follows, I will describe these elasticities as if they were both positive numbers.20 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 5 Responses with Rt Kept at Zero
values of 1/2 for each of these import price elasticities. There the effect of
the real exchange rate appreciation is eliminated, and the net export balance
reﬂectsonlythemovementofoutput. ThusJapan’snetexportsremainnegative
forabouttwoyears,brieﬂyturnpositive,andthenﬁnallystayslightlynegative
for a long time (despite long-run neutrality). Setting each country’s import
price elasticity instead at 1.0, close to the conventional wisdom, gives an
entirely different picture, with net exports staying strongly negative for a very
long time—see Figure 4.
There are many parameter changes that could be considered, but the more
important order of business is to discuss the upward movement of the interest
rate Rt that occurs in Figures 2–4. It is clear that the long-run response
is a rise of 0.005, which must of course be the case if there is monetary
superneutrality and an upward jump in target inﬂation of that magnitude.
But how are the dynamics in Rt being modeled? One extreme possibility is
that uncovered interest parity is maintained throughout. But that would be
inconsistent with my basic position (and with huge quantities of empirical
research). Accordingly, my ﬁrst attempts at this simulation exercise assumed
that the interest rate remains immobilized at its initial zero-lower-bound level.B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 21
Figure 6 Responses with UIP Maintained Throughout
That speciﬁcation leads, however, to the results shown in Figure 5. There the
responses are implausibly large, with inﬂation rising to almost 20,000 percent
per year. (Recall that the numbers shown are in fractional quarterly units.)
This might seem to reﬂect some kind of calculation error, but actually the
point is that if Rt were held unchanged, the increased inﬂation rate would
imply a reduction in the real interest rate of 2 percent per year, maintained
forever. In a forward-looking rational expectations model, such a change has
enormous effects. Furthermore, this way of treating the nominal interest rate
is inconsistent with superneutrality and inconsistent with what one believes
would happen in the face of a permanently increased inﬂation rate.
The other extreme treatment of Rt dynamics is to impose uncovered in-
terest parity in all periods. In that case, which I have already described as
unrealistic, we have the results shown in Figure 6, where the responses are all
very small. Consequently, for the experiments reported in Figures 2–4, I have
imposed the following compromise formula:
Rt = θR
uip
t + (1 − θ)Rt−1,(0 ≤ θ ≤ 1), (21)22 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 7 Responses with Fast Rt Adjustment
where R
uip
t is the value that would prevail if uncovered interest parity held in
each period. The value used for θ in Figures 2–4 is 0.01, but the results for xt
are not much different qualitatively if one adopts a value of 0.1 or 0.001—see
Figures 7 and 8. That is, the net export variable follows a pattern of the same
shape; quantitatively the effects are larger the smaller is θ. In all of Figures
5–8, the import price elasticity was kept at 1/2.
In sum, the simulation results suggest strongly that the move to a more
expansionary monetary policy by the BOJ, implemented by policy rule (5),
would not have beggar-thy-neighbor effects on Japan’s trading partners but
instead would induce an increase in their net exports to Japan.
7. THE BANK OF JAPAN LAW, MONETARY POLICY,AND
EXCHANGE-RATE POLICY
Letusnowturntothesecondmajorobjectionthathasbeenvoicedtotheadop-
tion of a policy rule such as (5), namely, that foreign exchange purchases and
sales cannot legally be conducted by the BOJ according to its charter. Only
a few years ago, in 1998, did the BOJ gain monetary policy independence,B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 23
Figure 8 Responses with Slow Rt Adjustment
i.e., the right and duty to conduct monetary policy as judged appropriate by
itself (rather than by the Ministry of Finance).35 The provisions of this in-
dependence are codiﬁed in a legal document that, in English, is termed “The
Bank of Japan Law.” The provisions of this law are of direct relevance be-
cause the BOJ evidently has seen the Law as an obstacle to a policy of the
typerecommendedabove. Purchasesofforeignexchange, itiscontended, are
the province of the Ministry of Finance, not the BOJ. An unofﬁcial English
translation of the Law, made by the BOJ, can be found on the BOJ’s web site
(http://www.boj.or.jp). The following comments and interpretation are based
on that version, as amended January 6, 2001.
The BOJ Law mentions foreign exchange purchases only in Articles 15,
40, 41, and 42. These references all simply presume that such purchases will
be made either for the purpose of “cooperating...with foreign central banks
and international institutions...” orelse “to stabilize the exchange rate of
the national currency.” Those activities, furthermore, are to be conducted
35 The law was promulgated on June 11, 1997, and put into effect on April 1, 1998. It has
been amended several times.24 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
in a manner speciﬁed by the Ministry of Finance. So viewed alone these
passages do apparently suggest that the BOJ has no mandate to purchase
foreign exchange in the manner suggested above, i.e., for macroeconomic
demand management.
However,Articles 1 and 2 of the Law stipulate that a primary duty of the
BOJisto“carryoutcurrencyandmonetarycontrol...”inamanner“aimedat,
through the pursuit of price stability, contributing to the sound development
of the national economy.” Also, Article 3 states that “the BOJ’s autonomy
regarding currency and monetary control shall be respected.” Thus the Law
also gives support to the idea that foreign exchange purchases for the purpose
of monetary control would be consistent with the duties that are explicitly




control in other forms,” i.e., forms other than money-market operations. This
suggests that the Law could be interpreted as stating that the Policy Board has
theauthoritytoadoptpoliciesforexertingmonetarycontrol bythepurchaseor
sale of foreign exchange. In that regard it is important to emphasize again that
thepurposeoftheforeignexchangetransactionsinquestionisdeﬁnitelynotto
stabilize the exchange rate. Instead, the recommended policy makes the level
of the exchange rate subservient to monetary policy, with the latter directed
at maintaining price stability so as to promote the sound development of the
Japanese national economy. So Article 15 adds to the evident inconsistency
in the Law.
Finally,however,weneedtoconsiderArticle43,whichstatesthattheBOJ
“...may not conduct any business other than those prescribed by this Law
unless such business is necessary to achieve the Bank’s objectives prescribed
by this Law and the Bank obtains authorization from the Minister of Finance
and the Prime Minister.” It would appear that this article does not rule out the
suggestedactivitiesperse, becausetheyareintegraltotheBOJ’sachievement
of its assigned objectives. Under recent conditions, moreover, they might
well be deemed “necessary.” Nevertheless, it would seem to be appropriate
for the BOJ to seek approval from the Minister of Finance and the Prime
Minister, since such a step would keep the proposed actions from conﬂicting
with Article 43. If the government were to favor more monetary stimulus, a
well-formulated proposal would presumably meet with approval (although it
is possible that political inﬁghting could interfere).
That the BOJ Law does not recognize foreign exchange transactions as a
means for conducting monetary policy is illogical but not actually surprising,
partlybecausetransactionsinvolvinggovernmentbillsaresatisfactoryandde-
sirable under normal conditions—i.e., with interest rates substantially above
zero. Furthermore, it must be noted that the Japanese arrangements are notB. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 25
out of line with those pertaining to central banks in other economies. In the
United States, for example, it is generally understood (despite unclear legisla-
tion) that foreign exchange policy is primarily the province of the Treasury.36
That assignment has not been troublesome for U.S. monetary policy in re-
cent years, but arguably that is so because the Treasury has seen ﬁt to let the
foreign exchange value of the dollar be determined by market forces without
substantial intervention. Even in the euro area, where monetary legislation
for the European Central Bank is expressly designed to protect central bank
independence and direct it toward price level stability, there is an anomalous
provision regarding exchange rates of the euro vis-a-vis the dollar, the yen,
and other currencies. This anomaly appears in Article 109 of the Maastricht
Treaty,whichgivestheE.U.CouncilofMinisters(i.e.,themembernations’ﬁ-
nance ministers37) the power to make agreements on an exchange-rate system
for the euro (relative to non-EU currencies) or to adopt “general orientations”
for exchange-rate policy. These actions are supposed not to conﬂict with the
goal of price stability, but the provision could nevertheless create difﬁculties.
Despite the existence of these actual arrangements, I suggest that it is
a mistake to view monetary policy and exchange-rate policy as independent
entities, as they implicitly suggest. Indeed, although it would be a slight
exaggeration to claim that monetary and exchange-rate policies are merely
different aspects of one macroeconomic policy tool, that claim comes closer
to the truth than the view suggesting that there are two distinct tools. (In
making this statement, I am assuming that the nation under discussion does
notattempttomanageexchangeratesbymeansofdirectcontrols,whichwould
ofcourseintroduceseriousmicroeconomicinefﬁcienciesandinducementsfor
corruption.) Let us develop that argument in the remainder of this section.
Onewaytoproceedistorecallthenatureofmonetaryarrangementsunder
a gold standard (or any other metallic standard). Any such arrangement on
an international basis clearly dictates exchange rates among all nations that
adopt gold-standard regimes. But such regimes are simultaneously speciﬁca-
tions of domestic monetary standards, ones that require monetary policy to
be governed by the overriding obligation of maintaining the domestic-money
price of gold—and consequently the value of money in terms of gold.
For ﬁat money systems the relevant analytical point is that, from a long-
runperspective,moneystockandexchange-ratepathscannotbeindependently
controlled or managed, basically as a consequence of the long-run neutrality
of money. Short-run non-neutralities are a fact of life, of course, so there is
somescopefortemporarydeparturesofexchangeratesfromthepathsimplied
by monetary policy. These departures can be effected by ﬁscal actions or
36 On this topic see Broaddus and Goodfriend (1996), which takes a position similar to that
of the present section, and Hetzel (1996). The quotes on page 21 of the latter are useful.
37 The Council members are ﬁnance or economics ministers when the business is ﬁnance or
economics, in which case the Council is known as Ecoﬁn. For other issues, other ministers will
represent the member countries. When the Council is attended by the countries’ prime ministers,
the meeting becomes a “summit.”26 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
possibly by sterilized—hence nonmonetary—exchange market interventions.
But since such departures will only be temporary, it is inappropriate (and
dangerous) to think of them as reﬂecting distinct macroeconomic policies.
A counterargument that some might raise would point out that real ex-
change rates can be affected permanently by ﬁscal stances. A higher steady
state ratio of government spending to income tends, for example, to generate
a higher real foreign-exchange value of a nation’s currency. But an increased
ratio of government consumption to income has a one-time effect on the real
exchangerate,notacontinuingorongoingeffect. Thusamonetarypolicythat
generates an average inﬂation rate that is inconsistent with a ﬁxed nominal
exchangerate—ormoregenerallyaspeciﬁednominalexchange-ratepathfea-
turinganonzerorateofdepreciationorappreciation—willeventuallyleadtoa
breakdown. Fiscalpolicycannot, thatis, beusedtoovercomelong-runincon-
sistencies between money stock, price level, and exchange-rate paths. Useful
papers elaborating on this point have been written by Bordo and Schwartz
(1996), Garber and Svensson (1995), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995).
Furthermore, it is important to keep in mind that a large fraction of ﬁs-
cal policy actions involves switches between bond ﬁnance and tax ﬁnance
for given streams of government purchases. This reminder is relevant be-
cause many standard and widely-used macroeconomic models incorporate
the property of Ricardian equivalence, i.e., the property that switches between
bond and tax ﬁnance have no effect on macroeconomic variables of primary
importance, including real and nominal exchange rates (and net exports).38
Admittedly, it is quite unlikely that actual economies possess this Ricardian
property in full, but evidence suggests that deviations are fairly minor. Thus
formostﬁscalpolicyactions, therewillbeatmostminororshort-livedeffects
on exchange rates.
The other possible way of exerting a policy effect on exchange rates is via
sterilizedinterventions, i.e., foreignexchangetransactionsthatareoffsetsoas
to result in no net change in the economy’s outstanding stock of base money.
It is widely agreed by students of the issue, however, that effects of sterilized
interventionsareatmostsmallandtemporary.39 Thustheytoocannotprovide
a means for escaping the long-run links between money stock and exchange
rate magnitudes.
Yet another way to put the argument is as follows. Most economists
agree that central banks possess only one signiﬁcant monetary policy tool.
Some would describe it as control over the monetary base whereas others
would emphasize the setting of short-term interest rates. But that distinction
isunimportantwithregardtotheissueathand;whatmattersisthatthereisonly
onesigniﬁcanttool. Consequently,ifthecentralbankisrequired(externallyor
38An early statement of this result is provided by Stockman (1983, 151–2).
39 For a survey of the literature, see Edison (1993).B. T. McCallum: Japanese Monetary Policy 27
by its own choice) to devote that policy tool to the achievement of some target
path for an exchange rate, then the tool is not available for achievement of a
domesticmacroeconomicobjective—beitexpressedintermsofinﬂationalone
or, e.g., some combination of inﬂation and output deviations from their target
values. In short, legislation or arrangements that give exchange-rate control
to the ﬁnance ministry, or some other branch of government, are basically
inconsistent with central bank independence.
8. CONCLUSION
On the basis of the arguments developed above, plus those presented in previ-
ous papers, it would appear that an appropriate policy would be for the Bank
ofJapantotemporarilymaintainagrowthrateofbasemoneyof10–15percent
per year, with most of the newly created base used to purchase foreign ex-
change(theremainderbeingusedtopurchaselong-termgovernmentbonds).40
After a growth rate of nominal GDP of 4–5 percent has been achieved, pol-
icy could then revert to more normal arrangements, with a target of about 2
percent measured inﬂation or 4–5 percent nominal GDP growth.41
There have been two prominent objections to this type of proposal. One
is that the proposed policy would have undesirable “beggar-thy-neighbor”
effects on Japan’s trading partners. Simulations with a calibrated model of
the “new open-economy macroeconomics” type suggest, however, that the
policy’s expansionary effects on output would lead to an increase, not a de-
crease, in Japanese imports. Presentation of the model and the simulation
study constitutes a major undertaking of the paper.
The second main objection has been that purchase of foreign exchange
is inconsistent with the Bank of Japan Law. But the arguments developed
above indicate that purchase of foreign exchange for the purpose of monetary
controlisbasicallyconsistentwiththoseprovisionsoftheLawthatcallforthe
BOJ to exert monetary control so as to contribute to the sound development
of the Japanese economy. Therefore, since the Law does not mention this
reasonforconductingforeignexchangetransactions,theBOJcouldovercome
the Law’s internal inconsistencies by requesting approval from the Minister
of Finance and the Prime Minister. It could also seek amendment of the
Law so as to recognize the close relationship between monetary policy and
exchange-rate policy, thereby strengthening Japan’s statutory basis for central
bank independence.
40 The range 10–15 percent is suggested, admittedly loosely, by the plots in the bottom panel
of Figure 1.
41 Studies including Shiratsuka (1999) suggest that measured overstates actual inﬂation in
Japan by about 1 percent per year.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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